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Abstract 
In the vicinity of open space, some authors have called the “dark web” the perfect 
“breeding grounds” for generating conditions for seeds of extremism to thrive and grow. The 
perceived anonymity and vast information databases found here present a perfect incubator 
for terrorist activity. Academics and policymakers alike are as well convinced that such an 
open space filled with recruiter masterminds is perfectly adept at embracing the unadoptable, 
unconventional, or socially unfit into terrorist or jihadi organizations. 
Nevertheless, regardless of organizations, modernization and adoption of new technological 
methods in which one can obtain ideas and information, many individuals are still and to a 
great extent, influenced by face-to-face interactions. Intimate environments of a religious 
institution, somewhat of a home-like feeling in community gathering center, can equally 
impact a person, as can the internet and its vast informational influence. 
For the reason of contributing to understand the radicalization in the Global Village, this 
article will examine differences in online and in-person radicalization and illustrate it with 
some examples and attempt to make a comparison between two different exposures to 
information and its effects on young individuals. 
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Introduction 
In the vicinity of open space, it does not come as surprise to call the “dark web” the 
perfect “breeding grounds” for generating the conditions for seeds of extremism to thrive and 
grow. The perceived anonymity and vast information databases found here present a 
convenient incubator for terrorist activity. Academics and policymakers alike are likewise 
convinced that such an open, unregulated space full of recruiter masterminds is perfectly 
adept at embracing the rejected, unconventional, or socially unfit into terrorist or jihad 
organizations. Utilizing social media is another very blatant approach to reaching massive 
amounts of people throughout the world for their support and being linked with like-minded 
individuals. This, in turn, leads to fundamentalism acting as a provider of strong meaning and 
identity for individuals and communities who may be experiencing a crisis in self-
determination or may perceive that their cultural identities are under threat. “Ultimately, the 
mass appeal of fundamentalism is security in deeply insecure world.”3 Although, other forms 
of radicalization occur online as well, this paper will solely deal with radicalization through 
religious ideology, which results in violence. Specifically, this paper will dive into the 
emerging influence and importance of social media in the radicalization process, compare it to 
the more traditional in-person process, and offer conclusions as to what can be done to curb 
radicalization’s violent outcomes. Since “No Trespassing” signs are a rarity on the Internet, 
the “dark web,” is generally thought of as just that – an area off limits to even the most 
seasoned Internet users. Ultimately, regardless of the influence of various institutions, 
modernization and adoption of new technological methods in which one can obtain ideas and 
information, many individuals are still and to a great extent, influenced by face-to-face 
interactions. The intimate environment of a religious institution, which offers a homey feeling 
within a trusted community, can equally impact a person, as can the information on the 
internet and its vast resources and methods of persuasion.  Oftentimes, an older person, who is 
perceived as a leader of a small community, is granted trust and is respected as a person of 
authority. For the reason of contributing to the understanding of the radicalization process in 
the “Global Village”, it is important to look for and examine differences in online and in-
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person (offline) radicalization patterns and illustrate them with a few examples in an attempt 
to explain their effects on young individuals. 
Given that there is prevailing evidence that many foreign fighters that have fled to Iraq 
and Syria in the past five years had a very basic understanding of Islam as a religion4, this 
assessment will examine why then religion is often used as the main ideology behind 
recruitment, trans-identity shaping, and communal belonging, rather than the motive of 
violence itself. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all the tools used 
in recruitment and radicalization, hence it will focus only on the impact of social media (more 
specifically, on online propaganda disseminated via social media) as well as provide examples 
of in-person radicalization as a juxtaposition and a means of comparison amongst the two 
types of radicalization.  
What is important to highlight is the fact that since 9/11, radicalization has been 
examined by researchers almost solely in terms of militant Islam, and this one-sided approach 
was mostly due to the fact that the use of religion as a driving ideology for terrorism has 
dramatically increased since 2000. Examination of the radicalization process in the past five 
years shows that the four biggest terrorist groups in 2013 are also the deadliest groups of the 
last fifteen years. 5 What binds all four groups are religious-professed and driven actions.6 
Encompassing and writing about all the different types of the radicalization processes, be it 
extremism on the left-right political spectrum, racism and other neo-Nazi groups, or any other 
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non-religious radicalization is beyond the scope of this paper. As Dr. Schmid notes “it is 
difficult enough to reach modicum of agreement on Islamist radicalization.”7  
Moreover, it is important to highlight that this paper is not about dissecting Islamist 
radicalization as a whole but looking into a type of radicalization that uses particular concepts 
of Islam as justification tools for violence. This paper will proceed in three ways: provide 
different views on the definition of radicalization and contextualize them within the domain of 
globalization, the Internet and social media. The radicalization process will henceforth be 
used only to refer to distinct type of recruits characterized by persons who are less integrated 
and whose radicalization results in violent acts of solo-terrorism.8 This will follow by the 
introduction of the different avenues of radicalization, focusing specifically on online and in-
person (offline) influence and illustrating their effects with a few examples. Only a few 
examples of radicalization will be given, for it is beyond the span of this article to explore all 
possible channels through which young people turn to radicalized ideas. Lastly, conclusions 
will be drawn and certain recommendations for future research will be made. 
 
Radicalization 
 “Jihadists will be killed, only to be reborn again in future generations and raised on 
the same books.”9  
One of the key authors today that follows the phenomenon of radicalization is Jason Burke, 
who views that “every use of force is another victory for Bin Laden…thus, creating a whole 
new cadre of terrorists.”10 Similarly, Noam Chomsky quotes an Israeli think tank and Saudi 
intelligence, who both conclude that the “vast majority” of foreign fighters in Iraq “are not 
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former terrorists”, but “became radicalized by the war itself, stimulated by the invasion 
(…)”.11 The true effects of foreign military intervention on radicalization have been 
extensively explored recently.  
For example, Pettinger notes that foreign military intervention causes backlash through 
terrorism, and the form of intervention affects what the output (of terrorism) looks like.12 
However, the main point of Pettinger’s study is that an individual’s propensity to engage in 
extremism is based on his or her level of de-pluralization - the developing perception that 
there exists only one solution, extreme violence - to take place13- which determines the extent 
of radicalization. The growth of radicalized individuals after 9/11 has been the object of study 
for many authors, predominantly those in the West.14 However, as already stated, 
radicalization, even though extensively researched in the past 15 years, still does not have a 
unified, comprehensive definition accepted amongst scholars. As with the definition of 
terrorism, the term radicalization encompasses a wide range of concepts- from being used as 
a tool for marginalization by discrediting and side-lining certain groups of people, to   
embodying a dangerous path towards violent actions. The important difference talked about 
very often is whether all types of radicalization result in violent actions or not, and if not, 
why? According to Bartlett and Miller, it is the first step of all studies on radicalization to 
distinguish “radicalization that leads to violence (‘violent radicalization’) and radicalization 
that does not lead to violence (‘non-violent radicalization’)”.15 The authors conclude that only 
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after the distinguishing these two types of radicalization, we can engage all economic, social 
as well as emotional (psychological reasons) reasons for radicalization. 
Many authors, including Edwin Bakker, claim that the role of family and family ties are 
crucial for investigation of organizational approaches to radicalization. He concludes that 
social affiliation, the most crucial factor in this process, plays a role in radicalization that 
results in violence.16 Similarly, Christmann has found that a key component to becoming fully 
radicalized is having exposure to a network or a movement. Social network theory, resource 
mobilization theory and framing theory offer another approach to studying the radicalization 
process, one that links structural factors, group processes and individual motivations within an 
integrated analytical framework.17  
To clarify further, this paper departs from the definition of radicalization given by C. 
McCauley and S. Moskalenko and more specifically, for the purpose of this paper we will 
adopt the 11th reason for Mass Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group, which is Hate18. 
Moskalenko and McCauley argue that strong group identification is connected with higher 
levels of peaceful activism as well as radical action. Furthermore, the claim is that the 
Collective Phenomenon - seeing a group of individuals as a part of the “same kind” amongst 
members of a group or category, explains why groups share empathy with their own and 
dislike the others. “This is the emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded 
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group, involving both a felt solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt group 
members and a felt difference from or even antipathy to specified outsiders.”19  
The sense of discomfort with “the other” has been singled out to explain why young 
men and women choose to join violent groups in their pursuits of certain goals. Even though 
most certainly misapprehended, there is also a belief that volunteering for the cause is a fight 
for fairness against oppression. It is a conjured revenge against those imagined and real who 
have hurt the individual and who have brought on a sense of humiliation after the War on 
Terror after 9/11. “It is often observed that groups in conflict, especially if the conflict 
involves prolonged violence, become more extreme in their negative perceptions of one 
another.”20 This tendency can become so extreme that the enemy is no longer seen as human. 
Dehumanizing the enemy or calling it “infidel” is one way of dividing people based on what 
is believed is just or not. Other authors, such are Doosje, Loseman and Van Den Bos argue 
that personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived intergroup threats are the main 
reasons radicalization appears  amongst youth in the Western World. They claim that a 
“combination of these three factors can contribute to support for a radical belief system, and 
that this belief system forms the basis of attitudes toward violent behavior by other Muslim 
extremists, and ultimately, intentions to actually engage in violent behavior toward other 
people.”21 
Today, the so-called state of ISIS, the Caliphate, is an arena where young men and 
women who flee to the promises of fighting for its cause can identify themselves with the 
very strict interpretation of Islam and the particular antipathy or even aversion and 
antagonism to “the Western ways of living”. The targeted outsiders are usually the Western 
liberal world. This is the simplified reasoning behind radicalization and a major reasoning 
behind what compels certain individuals to be radicalized over others.22 The agenda is to 
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segregate, isolate and offer alternatives to the presence and influence of “the other” that is 
usually led to be perceived as a threat. “Since ISIS is first and foremost a culture, not a militia, 
how do you prevent future generations from turning to jihadism when the influence of Fatwa 
Valley and its clerics and its culture and its immense editorial industry remains intact?”23 
Others are not quite so deterministic about the absolutist role of radicalization in its ability to 
lead to one specific objective, particularly violence. For example, scholar Sedgwick claimed 
that, simply put, the term “radicalization” itself is a source of confusion, hence the best 
solution for researchers is to abandon the idea that “radical” or “radicalization” are absolute 
concepts, to recognize the essentially relative nature of the term “radical,” and to be careful 
always to specify both the continuum being referred to and the location of what is seen as 
“moderate” on that continuum.24 Sedgwick further claims that even though popular, the term 
“radicalization” itself is overlapping in its agendas of security, integration, and foreign policy. 
Dalgaard-Nielsen also greatly contributed to the debate about radicalization, from a social 
movement theory point of view to a socio-psychological approach. Scholar concludes that 
“the challenge of generating solid empirical evidence to enhance the understanding of the 
phenomenon of radicalization connected to militant Islamism is substantial.”25 
A popular claim seems to be that “fundamentalism appeals to the heart while 
disregarding the mind… [that] it is a cheap rabble-rousing pitch designed to seduce the 
thoughtless, ill-informed, disgruntled and frustrated masses with a set of simple solutions.”26 
It is important to note the terms like radicalization and fundamentalism overlap in many 
studies and are very often used interchangeably. “Religious fundamentalism has at its heart 
the ability to offer three things that are increasingly desirable for individuals and communities 
throughout the world as they confront modernization and globalization: meaning, identity and 
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security.”27 It was indeed argued that organizational membership accelerates the effects of 
religious identity on the individual-level, leading to radical and violent actions. Scholars like 
Hirsch-Hoeflera, Canettib, and Eiran have observed that contrary to the dominant belief that 
religious identity alone is ample to trigger violence, it is actually the role of organizational 
membership to tie religious identity with radical action. The authors have attempted to fill in 
the gap in related literature of a causal relationship between radicalization and actual violence, 
by claiming that organizational support is absolutely necessary to trigger violence. Similarly, 
Hoffman writes that “religious identity is a motivating factor for radical action, but it is the 
sense of belonging which serves as the trigger for radical action”28 This claim is in apparent 
contrast to studies advocating the theory of lone-wolf terrorists and how they operate on their 
own and are not endorsed by any network or organization, but it further adds to the discussion 
about the complexity and multiplicity of factors to be taken into account when studying 
radicalization. 
 Now, it is very important to understand that there is a great deal of discussion that 
surrounds the question of whether “religion is simply a tool for mobilization or … a primary 
motive.”29 Many critical terrorism studies scholars (Gunning and Jackson, 2007) observe that 
the distinction is crucial and that “the religious label attached to terrorism is employed as a 
political tool in order to discredit certain ideologically opposing groups and their claims.30  
 
Radicalization in the Global Age 
When computers began to really take hold and became more affordable, so did the 
access and availability of the Internet. This, in turn, had created a much more globalized 
world with a multitude of opportunities to connect to every corner of the world. It had 
essentially created a borderless world where influence can be instantly transmitted trans-
nationally with little to no oversight or restrictions. The physical and technological borders in 
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the world have become thinner. Prior to the Internet, ideas could be controlled and censored 
and books could be restricted or banned - as has been done extensively throughout history. 
The limitation on information flow had enforced and strengthened our borders, kept us 
culturally sovereign and isolated, and more often than not, forced individuals to succumb to 
the prescribed identity to which they were born into. Since the spread of the Internet, this is no 
longer the prevailing reality in the world, as technology is widely available to spread 
information quickly and cost-effectively. Due to this, many ideologies can easily spread and 
take root in a number of culturally unrelated areas, tying diverse individuals from all over the 
world with common views and agendas in a matter of seconds. As a result, RAND31 
researchers observed that, “the internet offers terrorists and extremists the capability to 
communicate, collaborate and convince.”32 According to the abovementioned qualitative 
study, it has been confirmed that the internet was widely prominent in the radicalization 
process of violent extremists and terrorists, and that “the internet has expanded opportunities 
for radicalization [by acting as]… a means through which to filter material that is consistent 
with one’s beliefs (the internet as an ‘echo chamber’).”33 Another qualitative study by scholar 
Koehler has confirmed that “compared to other ‘socialization institutions’, such as offline 
group activities, music and concerts, rallies and political trainings, the Internet appears as the 
most important element driving individual radicalization processes, according to the used 
material.”34 
“The term globalization has come to be emotionally charged in public discourse. For 
some, it implies the promise of an international civil society, conducive to a new era of peace 
and democratization. For others, it implies the threat of an American economic and political 
hegemony, with its cultural consequence being a homogenized world resembling a sort of 
metastasized Disneyland (charmingly called a ‘cultural Chernobyl’ by a French government 
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official)”.35 Often nowadays, we do not speak of globalization or the global age as a 
phenomenon, since it had taken root in world affairs and public consciousness perhaps even 
before the invention of the World Wide Web in the 90s. However, we can discuss the effects 
of “the Global Age” even today, as it shapes new phenomena or continues impacting existing 
phenomena ', giving them a new form. Radicalized young people who are fleeing to Syria and 
Iraq as foreign fighters, in such higher numbers36 are, for one, a cause for alarm. As Berger 
and Huntington observe, “we now have a picture of a cultural earthquake affecting virtually 
every part of the world … (t)hen there are attempts at militant rejection, be it under banners of 
religion (Taliban) or nationalism (North Korea)”.37 Benjamin Barter portrayed that jihadi, or 
for that reason, any other isolated individual with antipathy against globalization (whatever its 
larger implications) who is  on his or her path to  shying away from modernity, identifies the 
self by contrasting it with an alien “other” and makes politics an exercise in exclusion and 
resentment38. For the same reason Barber holds that Jihad39 is at war with McWorld.40  
Similarly, scholar Appadurai notes, “there is growing evidence that the consumption 
of the mass media throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, and selectivity. 
Terrorists are modeling themselves on Rambo-like figures (who have themselves generated a 
host of non-Western counterparts (…)”.41 As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, 
so are the messages and actions of fundamentalists, which are more easily spread and are 
proving to be highly influential.  
What particularly stands out about this is that although they are opposed to 
globalization and its sister trend modernization, radicalization recruiters did not fail to utilize 
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the very first herald of technological modernization - social media. Not only did they not 
reject it or fail to utilize it, they sought to maximize its functionality by turning it into a 
powerful tool of communication in order to get their message across easily and systematically 
driving more people to their cause. Social media was ironically a Western invention that 
served as a blessing in disguise for the recruiters to spread their ideology quickly and 
efficiently; what would have taken countless media outlets (who would be willing to 
broadcast) to get their message across, now requires one smart phone and internet connection. 
The impact of mass reach through information brings to mind the Chinese proverb that says 
“kill one, make ten thousand watch”: this is exactly what the jihadi beheadings do now, 
although ten thousand has risen to ten million. Social media has proven to be a very powerful 
communication tool and community medium, perhaps ever more powerful than the local 
imam or any local mosque one could go to for gaining knowledge and information. The mass 
increase of foreign fighters, who flooded and shaped what was at first a civil war in Syria, has 
been linked to the extensive use of social media in radicalizing people for the cause of the 
Caliphate. When and how did YouTube replace the pulpit, or does it only represent its reach 
of influence? It goes without saying that globalization and its effects had further accelerated 
fundamentalists’ actions, particularly though the global reach of the social media platform. 
Not only can their messages be spread easier, but there are also a few restrictions on 
censorship in worldwide media to classify questionable content and certain action as a 
terrorist threat, which could otherwise raise mass public hysteria. Further fueling the divide 
and adding to the security chaos, the influence of the media in inspiring even more young 
people to search for assistance and inspiration within groups that would embrace them for 
what they want to become- martyrs. Recruiters have utilized social media avidly, knowing the 
favorable outcomes of online recruitment; while under the wing of freedom of speech, they 
are ultimately using online space for promoting hate and violence.  
Charles Taylor writes “all societies are becoming increasingly multicultural, while at 
the same time becoming more porous. Indeed, these two developments go together […] 
means that they are more open to multinational migration; more of their members live the life 
of Diaspora, whose center is elsewhere.”42 These observations serve to prove how some 
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immigrant communities, very notably in France, for example, haven’t really assimilated, but 
in turn are still tied to their land of origin for the reasons of not being able to recognize or 
receive the imagined and expected benefits of multiculturalism that is at the root of the 
historical identity of their adopted host country. 
 
Identity Search On-line – Self-Radicalization 
The threat and likelihood of radicalization appears to have increased in today’s global 
society. As expressed by Evan Kohlmann, international terrorist organizations can now reach 
individuals in remote locations around the globe through online training manuals, audio/visual 
recordings, and chat forums.43 In fact, the latest statistics show that social media’s influence 
on behavioral patterns in American youth, are at an all-time high.44 Similarly, Brian Michael 
Jenkins observes that individuals are the most vulnerable “at a stage of life where they are 
seeking an identity, while looking for approval and validation. They are searching for causes 
that can be religiously and culturally justified, that provide them a way to identify who they 
are, and that provide a clear call for action.”45 Other authors have explored particular ways 
and pathways employed by terrorist groups to recruit or inspire people to carry on violence. 
Currently, there are a variety of tools, such as digital journals, that have inspired young people 
in the West to rebel against the contemporary order of things.46 Designed to radicalize 
marginalized Muslims in the West and motivate them to initiate independent acts of terror, 
Inspire’s (digital journal) message has resonated with a number of readers. Indeed, “only a 
few inspired readers would be needed to cause significant destruction and loss of life.”47 
Inspire’s target audience is made clear by its content, aimed at prospective lone wolf 
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terrorists, primarily Muslims in the West who have feelings of subordination in their countries 
of current residence. This individual might fit the ‘Loner’ description in Pantucci’s typology 
(2011) of lone wolf terrorists: “an individual who plans or attempts to carry out an act of 
terrorism using the cover of extreme Islamist ideology . . . [without] any actual connection or 
contact with extremists—beyond what they are able to access through passive consumption 
on the Internet or from society at large.”48 Probably the highest rate of success in recruitment 
and radicalization has been ascribed to the online propaganda of a journal called Dabiq, which 
is published in multiple languages49. It is extremely well-organized and sophisticated, 
disseminating its message of radicalization in several language editions and receiving  much 
attention, especially in its success of luring young people to join the so-called  Islamic State. 
In general, the Internet’s role in self-radicalization is becoming clearer. Some authors 
(i.e. Musa and Bendett, 2010) trace an increase in terrorist plots by individuals who were 
inspired by the media, who sought out like-minded individuals online, did not participate in a 
face-to-face Muslim community, and lacked a strong interpersonal connection to a terrorist 
network.50 In these cases—as with Pantucci’s loners’ explanation—Internet media was the 
primary or sole link to jihad ideology and information. To explain these individuals’ 
evolvement into prospective terrorists, Helfstein (2012) offers a useful model of the self-
radicalization process with four stages: Awareness, Interest, Acceptance, and Implementation. 
In Helfstein’s model, awareness is a long-term process that occurs over time as an 
individual’s knowledge of radical ideology and tactics deepens. Interest in this model consists 
of more than just curiosity; it also includes “the willingness to alter one’s belief system or 
social norms to reflect those associated with an ideological doctrine.”51 When a potential 
“lone wolf” becomes lured by jihad under this model, he or she can more easily integrate 
jihadist ideology into his or her own thinking. Acceptance is the final assimilation of radical 
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ideas and norms into a recruit’s thought processes. Recruits to violent causes must readily 
accept the necessity of violence to achieve sociopolitical goals and enact radical ideology. 
Only then can the newly radicalized individual follow through on the implementation of a 
violent act. Helfstein states that current evidence shows that self-radicalization is not a linear 
process but rather an incremental development within an individual that may contain feedback 
loops. Moreover, this long-term process can be either interrupted or reinforced by outside 
factors, including the individuals themselves.  
Some people become aware and interested but don’t complete the acceptance process 
“without greater exposure to new information and social relationships”; furthermore, 
‘interested parties’ may intervene to support or discourage radicalization”52 Some segments of 
the process are also easier to complete. Helfstein argues that developing awareness is 
relatively simple, but gaining deeper interest in acting on ideological impulses   is more 
challenging. The movement from interest to acceptance is especially difficult. However, terror 
propagandists are well aware of the challenges of this self-radicalization process. Helfstein 
notes that much of the recruitment messaging focuses on moving prospective participants 
from interest to acceptance, because following acceptance, there is “a tendency to reduce 
cognitive dissonance”53 by proceeding directly to violent action. Once at acceptance, the 
recruit must act violently to embody his or her new perspective. 
In-Person Radicalization 
Contrary to what some authors believe about the power of interconnectivity in the 
digital age and its role in accelerating radical ideas, other authors believe that it is the local, 
in-person contact that ultimately leads to a successful radicalization process characterized by 
violent action. Many scholars of this persuasion will highlight that the vast majority of people 
can solely sustain their radical ideas by visiting right-wing websites, but would never be 
propelled to act on them, whereas if they engage in a local community and are exposed to 
local Muslim bookstores, hookah bars, mosques, virtually anywhere where radical  Muslims 
congregate in person, it is more likely that their radicalization process will eventually lead to a 
tangible participation  in the fundamentalist struggle. Authors like Alison Pargeter have 
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explored the role of localism and radicalization that had no or very limited contact with 
possible recruiters. For her research, Pargeter observed neglected, poor and small 
communities in Morocco, Libya and Tunisia for their increased Islamic militarization and 
found the following: “Given that these regions have produced Islamists in numbers 
disproportionate to the size of their populations, it would seem that this conservative mindset 
found it especially difficult to adapt to the shock of modernization engendered by the colonial 
and post-independence periods.”54 Parger also notes that “one should not be too reductionist: 
the nexus between Islamism and local issues cannot explain radicalization per se”, and that, in 
fact, “individuals’ motivations for taking up radical action are always multifaceted.”55 
Unlike the online process, in-person radicalization encompasses everything but 
anonymity. Young people who participate in local community center activities are present to 
the teachings, lessons and simple ceremonial activities, which allows for a more personal 
level of influence than what the Internet can offer. In some countries, the contact with former 
foreign fighters and “martyrs” is considered to be a significant indicator of the power of in-
person interaction and influence. For example, just in the past year, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
officials had arrested dozens of people on the suspicion of having traveled to Iraq and Syria to 
fight alongside ISIS, or who were suspected to be providing the Sunni militant group with 
weapons and cash.56 Last year, Bosnia passed a law that bans citizens from fighting in foreign 
countries. “The appearance of young radicalized Bosnian Muslims will only add to those 
tensions, and further prevent Bosnia from starting to move toward NATO and EU 
integration.”57 Bosnian security expert, Vlado Azinovic, also believes that the roots of Islamic 
militancy in the country and the fact that approximately 200 young men had recently gone to 
fight for the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria is a result of the ideology brought in by the 
Mujahedeen fighters during the 1992-95 Bosnian war.58 Given that some of the Mujahedin 
fighters had remained in the country, many experts, including Azinovic, claim that it is the 
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direct impact of these groups on vulnerable young people that resulted in the consequent 
attraction of the youth toward radical ideas and their motivation for seeking opportunities to 
aid their Muslim brothers in conflict. “Once a destination country for foreign fighters in the 
1990s, Bosnia is now the country of origin for volunteers in other people’s wars.” Statistics 
show that Bosnia yields one of the largest groups of foreign jihadists in Europe, prompting 
officials in the country to crack down on extremists. Another report published by the 
European Parliament in 2013 showed that about 3,000 people in Bosnia identified themselves 
as Wahhabists, a conservative Muslim movement introduced in the country in the early 90s. 
Bosnian officials have stated that the group primarily identifies itself with ISIS ideology and 
is responsible for influencing countless of unemployed, hopeless and vulnerable Bosnian 
youth. 
Similarly, in the case of Kenya,59 officials have recognized that some mosques serve as 
breeding grounds for radicalization and are luring young people into wars, fueling conflicts 
and further dividing the already stratified country. As a backlash to the emerging incidences 
of radicalization through institutional influence, mosques and other Islamic communities are 
under increasing scrutiny and are very keen to rebuild a positive image and disassociate 
themselves from radical affiliations by highlighting the basic principles of Islam as a peaceful 
religion that forbids violence. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
used all sources available including, infiltration, surveillance and monitoring in order to 
“prevent” the seeds of radicalization from growing in local Muslim communities. “In addition 
to using paid informants to monitor mosques, the FBI has also asked—and sometimes 
pressured—American Muslim community members to report on the views and activities of 
their fellow worshippers.”60 However, very often, the local Muslim community saw these 
actions, as a strategic tool for racial profiling and a violation of their basic human rights.  
Taking a neutral stand to the legality of such policy making in the US, it's important to 
note and acknowledge that, in fact, many policy makers across the globe have come to the 
conclusion that in-person, on-the-ground interaction is equally, if not more relevant to the 
process of radicalization to online and other means of influence. Consequently, they have 
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attempted to implement measures to contain and control the interpersonal communication and 
contact in many Muslim religious institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
It is an act of arrogance to think that the subordinate are poor, rejects, victims of destiny, and 
therefore incapable of reacting or planning, needing something originating elsewhere to 
enable them to speak.61 
People will always find ways to materialize their ideas and put them into practice, and 
therefore, we should never ignore those that think their ideas are not only rejected, but simply 
impossible to implement under social constraints. In addition to the lack of a universally 
accepted definition or the scope of the term radicalization, it is important to note that so far, 
no credible correlation has been made between a person being conclusively radicalized, and 
one absolutely determined to engage in violent actions. Of course, this paper is not suggesting 
that any idea picked up online or from an extreme local imam would lead a person to 
immediately strap him or herself with explosives, nevertheless there is also growing evidence 
of correlation between the exposure of radicalism and perceived inequalities with a certain 
level of action or support, and that one should not underestimate the seducing power of 
religion and or its ideological interpretation. “Religious fundamentalism will continue to grow 
around the world, because it offers a powerful response to modernization and globalization, 
which specifically resonates with communities who do not view secularization as an 
inevitable aspect of the shift into modernity.”62 Until religious fundamentalism is treated as a 
sociopolitical force in its own right, and unless its causes are dealt with in a holistic manner, it 
will continue to grow, fueling conflicts around the world.63 
On the other hand, media’s hysterical broadcasting and sensationalist reporting and 
willingness to air content originating from social media, as well as its relentless approach to 
demonize all Muslim populations and generalize them on the actions of a few radicals creates 
ever-increasing frustration, general bigotry and division in multiethnic societies. The media 
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seeking sensationalism for the purpose of spreading fear and increasing profit from what 
Samuel Huntington has called “Clash of Civilizations” will continue to blur the actual process 
of radicalization, the tools used in its propagation, and its actual impact on actions. The 
worldwide media (and to some extent academia) earnestly picked up the radicalization 
concept and misused it to portray and further the religious ideological divide destabilizing 
international security. Finally, some governments also went as far to justify monitoring 
actions, infiltrations and surveillance of their citizens under the guise that preventing 
radicalization is key to combating violent extremism, and given the evidence, this might seem 
like an important conclusion. However, how much of a threat does radicalization truly pose? 
How much of it is constantly overblown by media, and how much by the governments? 
Finally, since one is unable to completely compare the two types of radicalization discussed 
here, it might never be possible to say that seeing a local imam in community centre was 
precisely the reason one has decided to join “a Holy War”, nor it will be possible to say that a 
young man living in a remote village in the north of Morocco was never exposed to aired 
content that triggered his actions. However, what we are able to do with certainty is attempt to 
highlight the tools employed in the radicalization process, and acknowledge that there are 
additional factors impacting the process and the public perception and public policy towards 
it. Many prominent authors who have devoted decades to the study of terrorism and 
radicalization, such is Bruce Hoffman, would simply state that online and offline exposure to 
radical ideas are equally important causal factors and that “The requirement to engage in jihad 
is relentlessly expounded in  […] web sites, and radical clerics who lay preachers speaking in 
mosques or addressing informal circles of adherents in more private settings”64 Finally, 
Hoffman will conclude that “the principle of jihad is the ideological bond that unites this 
amorphous movement, transcending its loose structure, diverse membership, and geographical 
separation.”65 Von Behr et al. claim that “the Internet is one aspect of radicalization, and it is 
essential for future research to look both online and offline to be able to understand the 
process as a whole.”66 We can conclude that even though the subject of radicalization is 
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extensively researched, the field is still in need of expansion and enrichment by most 
importantly, the primary empirical data. Although all radicalization mechanisms are relevant, 
social media is the most powerful, because it is the easiest, fastest and a borderless means of 
spreading and influencing certain ideology. The Internet, after all, is the 21st century’s 
Television and Radio. From the literature overview we were able to understand that no 
credible author would undermine the use of social media in radicalization, but that many 
would be hesitant to claim it is the only way, and would look beyond Internet into offline 
radicalization. 
There will be a great need in the future to empirically study and theoretically further 
explore what environmental and personality characteristics lead to radicalization. Likewise, it 
will be essential to identify the most successful ways radicalization is employed that leads to 
violent action, both for the essential purpose of combating its propagation and also for 
shattering the media’s bias toward fanning the fires of Muslim extremism. Since the 
radicalization of youth in North American and Western Europe will only tend to increase in 
the coming years, based on the multitude of factors, closer cooperation between various law 
enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies is vital. In addition, academics as well as media 
will need to further explore channels without fueling confusion in the area of radicalization. 
The Arab spring, as well as recent economic crisis has made a lot of young people in Western 
societies anxious and looking for ways to engage meaningfully in the “struggle for justice” 
and thus has put more pressure on counterterrorism policy worldwide. It is important in this 
struggle for de-radicalization of youth to engage local community to its fullest potential, as 
teachers, coaches and parents are missing the early clues of radicalization process. As a 
society of isolated individuals concerned with accumulation of wealth North America and 
Western Europe are missing the link with their disenchanted young population that is 
spending increasingly more time with those who offer meaning and less in the community that 
offers belonging. The need to combat online radicalization, as well as local charismatic radical 
Islamists is placed on the shoulders of law enforcement, but the community has to share the 
burden if it is to be successful in this battle. Communication between all levels of 
governments and community is vital for the success of de-radicalization. 
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